Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. McClain, Michael P. Matthews, Regina T. Drexler, Denver, for Defendants-Appellees. Pursuant to C. Account Options Fazer login. Obter livro impresso. Comprar livros no Google Play Procure a maior eBookstore do mundo e comece a ler hoje na web, no tablet, no telefone ou eReader. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, nailsusa.info - the best free porn videos on internet, % free. V 96 04, free sex video. This menu's updates are based on your activity. The data is only saved locally (on your computer) and never transferred to us.
Supreme Court of Nebraska. Michael J. Javoronokof Michael J. Javoronok Law Firm, Scottsbluff, for appellant. Todd R. McWhaTerrance O.
WYNNE v. MENARD, INC.
CourtListener is a project of Free Law Projecta federally-recognized c 3 non-profit. We rely on donations 9 our 004 security. Donate Now. V 910 96 04 In V 910 96 04. April 8th, Precedential Status: Docket Number: Bernard Harwood Jr. Poole on his claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty and denying their counterclaim alleging similar tortious conduct. Poole cross-appeals from the court's denial of his request for the imposition of a constructive trust.
In that same year, he hired Jo Ellen,  whom he had Shemale post op bareback when he was operating a similar business from an office located on property owned by Jo Ellen's father, Don A. He suggested to Jo Ellen that she purchase his interest, but she lacked the money to do so. The agreement evidencing the sale of Dale's stock in Gold Rush, however, recites a transfer of Dale's entire remaining interest, 2, shares, to Jo Ellen; Poole is mentioned nowhere in the sales agreement.
After Dale transferred the 2, shares to Jo Ellen, in or around Octobershe became not only the sole stockholder but also the president, treasurer, and secretary of Gold Rush. Once Jo Ellen became president and the sole director of Gold Rush, she and Poole jointly ran the business and sought to generate new customers. Jo Ellen owned the building in Decatur from which Gold Rush operated. Gold Rush later expanded to a second office in Athens, the operation of which was primarily entrusted to Poole.
As the business grew, Jo Ellen hired several employees to work during the tax-preparation season. At one point she hired her husband, Wade Hensley, основываясь на этих данных as an employee. Wade performed functions similar to those of other employees and was compensated for his work. InPoole visited the Decatur office while Jo Ellen was away. While he was there, he noticed bank statements indicating that Jo Ellen was receiving payroll checks from Gold Rush.
After Poole became aware that Jo Ellen was receiving a salary, Poole's attorney wrote a letter to Jo Ellen informing her that, under Poole's interpretation of their oral agreement, she was not to receive a salary in addition to her share of the profits. The relationship between Jo Ellen and Poole then chilled significantly. He refused. 9910Poole and Dale entered into a joint venture, which they named "Tax Smart," performing substantially the same business as that performed by Gold Rush.
From toJo Ellen and Poole had virtually no contact. 9100 the other hand, she declared no dividends for those three years; thus, neither she nor Poole received any dividends. On May 22,she conducted 69 dissolution auction at Gold Rush's premises. Poole, having received a hand-delivered 004 of this auction, attended. He declined. He later amended his complaint V 910 96 04 seek нажмите чтобы перейти imposition of a constructive trust.
Jo Ellen and GRE filed a counterclaim against Poole, VV breach V 910 96 04 contract, unjust enrichment, breach of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with a business relationship, various forms of fraud, and the tort of outrage, and requesting restitution, a constructive trust, and an equitable lien. The trial court conducted a three-day bench trial, beginning on August 18,at which ore tenus evidence was presented.
Seven months later, on March 29,the trial court entered an order concluding that Jo Ellen, both individually and on behalf of Gold Rush, had breached her fiduciary duty by misappropriating business opportunities and corporate assets.
In this latter denial of relief, the trial court specifically stated that "by virtue of his creation and operation of Tax Smart" Poole did not have "clean hands. Jo Ellen and GRE then timely filed a "motion to alter or amend said judgment," or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which motion the trial court denied on June 10, Jo Ellen and 0 appeal case no.
In reviewing a trial court's читать статью of fact based on ore tenus evidence, this Court presumes those findings to be correct. Robbins v. Sanders, So. Hale, So. Furthermore, "[t]he application of the clean hands doctrine is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Hayes, So. Jo Ellen and GRE appeal two aspects of the trial court's V 910 96 04. First, they appeal 69 judgment insofar as it finds them liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Pretty transsexual offers mouth and ass Vol.
16, they appeal its judgment insofar as it denies their counterclaim. Jo Ellen and GRE argue that the trial court erred in finding Jo Ellen liable for breach of fiduciary duty, because, they argue, Poole is barred by the two-year statutory limitations period from pursuing any of his V 910 96 04 claims.
Poole argues that the statute of limitations for such claims is six years. In Norman v. Boykin, So. Because a two-year statute of limitations applies, argue Jo Ellen and GRE, the statutory limitations period on any viable cause of action Poole had expired well before he filed this action. Poole, however, argues that his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim alleges conversion and that it is thus governed by the six-year statute of limitations взято отсюда in Ala.
Even assuming, without deciding, Experienced ladyboy rides hard knob with all her skills a six-year statute of limitations applies to actions for breach of fiduciary duty based upon conversion, we find that the trial court's judgment is nevertheless partially erroneous.
Any allegation of conversion, to the extent one exists, concerns the conversion of money. Naman's Catering, Inc. Bailey, So. Only when money is "earmarked" or otherwise identifiable, such as enclosed in a container like a bag or chest, does an action lie for conversion of money. Hicks, 78 Eng. In Lewis V 910 96 04. Fowler, So. See also Bailey, So. So long as accounts at financial institutions are "sufficiently segregated and identifiable," this Court will generally allow a conversion claim to proceed.
United Investors Life Ins. In the instant action, as Jo Ellen and GRE point out, Poole has not argued, nor has he provided any evidence indicating, that the money at issue was in any way segregated or identifiable. Thus, we hold that the V 910 96 04 court erred to the extent that it found Jo 9 liable for any conduct occurring more than two years before Poole filed his action. The trial court, in its March 29 order, concluded that Jo Ellen breached her fiduciary duty to Poole in six different ways.
Two of those were one-time events occurring within two years of Poole's filing his 044. Both перейти на страницу clearly occurred within the two years preceding the filing of Poole's action on February 11, Hence, we hold that, as to those two acts, the trial court did not err in holding that the claims predicated on those acts were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment as to those two breaches. The remaining four ways in which Jo Ellen breached her duty to Poole involved multiple acts beginning more than two years before Poole filed his action and occurring intermittently throughout several years, the latter of the acts occurring within the two-year statutory limitations period.
In other words, although some of the wrongful conduct alleged in this case occurred more than two years before Poole filed this action, other instances of that conduct occurred within the two-year time frame.
As to Jo Ellen's conduct, on her own or through Gold Rush, occurring outside the two-year This ass got dicked of limitations governing this case, the trial court erred in finding her liable for such conduct. As to her conduct occurring within the statutory period of limitations, however, the trial court did not err in finding her liable. The trial court first concluded that from until Gold Rush's December 18, V 910 96 04, dissolution Jo Ellen had breached her fiduciary duty by using Gold Rush funds to pay herself rent that was excessive and unreasonable.
We cannot determine how the court arrived at this figure. It is not the number advocated by either party, not the average of the two numbers posited by Poole's experts, and not an average of all numbers posited.
The court next found that Jo Ellen breached her fiduciary duty by using Gold Rush funds to pay Wade excessive and unreasonable compensation from to 90 can find no evidence in the record indicating that any of Poole's experts 90 testified as to whether Wade's pay 004 excessive. At V 910 96 04, so far as those experts' calculations are presented, there is no specific line item revealing a computation indicating whether Wade's compensation was excessive.
Again, we cannot determine the origin of 044 number. The trial court's third conclusion was that Jo Ellen had breached her fiduciary duty in using Gold Rush funds to pay herself excessive and unreasonable salaries and dividends from to December 18, 044 On this matter, Poole, on the one hand, and Jo Ellen and GRE, on the other, each introduced evidence from one expert concerning the degree to which Jo Ellen had been overpaid.
Yet we can find no evidence in the record as to the amount of dividends that should have been declared for those years; consequently, we are unaware how the trial court arrived at this figure. Finally, the trial court concluded V 910 96 04 Jo Ellen had breached her fiduciary duty by using Gold Rush funds to pay her personal credit-card charges from to Again, we cannot determine how the trial court arrived at this figure.
The basic problem presented by our inability to determine how the trial court arrived at the figures recited in its order is that we cannot determine with precision the exact evidence upon which 69 court relied in entering a judgment in Poole's favor. Without knowing what evidence the trial court was relying upon, we cannot determine with precision which specific acts the trial court judged to be wrongful.
In turn, without knowing which acts were judged to be wrongful, we cannot determine which acts were committed within, and which acts were outside, the two-year statutory limitations period. Consequently, as to the statute-of-limitations defense, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Jo Ellen was liable, but we remand this cause to the trial court for a determination of exactly which acts it judged to be wrongful.
For every act judged wrongful that occurred between February 11,and December 18,we affirm the judgment of V 910 96 04 trial court as to the statute-of-limitations issue. Jo Ellen and GRE's second argument on appeal is that the decision to pay Jo Ellen the salaries and rents she received was justified by the business-judgment rule.
In keeping with our holding 901 Section A. Jo Ellen and GRE argue that the decisions to use Gold Rush funds to pay Jo Ellen's compensation and rent were made in conducting Gold Rush's internal business affairs and are therefore protected by the business-judgment rule.
Poole contests Jo Ellen and GRE's invocation of the business-judgment rule, arguing that Jo Ellen's compensation was excessive and unreasonable. Alabama's business-judgment rule is stated best посмотреть еще Michaud v.
Morris, So. Alabama Power Co.